Boosting promotes advantageous risk-taking by Folke, Tomas et al.
ARTICLE
Boosting promotes advantageous risk-taking
Tomas Folke 1,2✉, Giulia Bertoldo3, Darlene D’Souza4, Sonia Alì5, Federica Stablum 2 & Kai Ruggeri 2,6
Due to the prevalence and importance of choices with uncertain outcomes, it is essential to
establish what interventions improve risky decision-making, how they work, and for whom.
Two types of low-intensity behavioural interventions are promising candidates: nudges and
boosts. Nudges guide people to better decisions by altering how a choice is presented,
without restricting any options or modifying the underlying payoff matrix. Boosts, on the
other hand, teach people decision strategies that focus their attention on key aspects of the
choice, which allows them to make more informed decisions. A recent study compared these
two types of interventions and found that boosts worked better for risky choices aimed at
maximising gains, whereas nudges worked best for choices aimed at minimising losses.
Though intriguing, these findings could not be easily interpreted because of a limitation in the
items used. Here we replicate that study, with an extended item set. We find that boosts
work by promoting risk-taking when it is beneficial, whereas nudges have a consistent
(lesser) impact, regardless of whether risk-taking is beneficial or not. These results suggest
that researchers and policymakers should consider the base rate risk propensity of the target
population when designing decision-support systems.
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R isky decision-making is difficult, and people often do notmake optimal choices when it comes to risk (Cox et al.,2015). Risky choices depend on risk preferences as well as
the capacity for probabilistic reasoning, and there appears to be
great variation in both (Dohmen et al., 2010; Hallahan et al., 2004;
Grable, 2000). Despite the plenitude of interventions that have
been designed to improve decision-making under risk, it is far
from a solved problem.
One concept that has been central to formal reasoning about
risky choices is expected value (EV). The EV of an option is the
sum of its possible outcomes, weighted by their respective
probabilities (Kagel and Roth, 2016). Picking the option with the
highest EV is advantageous, in the sense that over infinite itera-
tions of the same choice picking the highest EV option leads to
the largest gains (or smallest losses). For this reason, picking the
highest EV option will be referred to as “the advantageous choice”
throughout this paper. This is intended as an imperfect shorthand
rather than an absolute claim of optimality. Picking a low EV
option can be self-consistent (e.g., when risk preferences over-
whelm the wish to maximise rewards), and beneficial in specific
contexts (e.g., when any loss would be catastrophic).
There have been numerous attempts in the behavioural sci-
ences to help people manage risk better, however, such inter-
ventions do not always produce consistent effects (Hummel and
Maedche, 2019), and sometimes fail to generalise from the con-
text for which they are created (Mills, 2020). For example, it has
long been concluded that individuals have different risk pre-
ferences for choices framed as maximising rewards rather than
choices framed as minimising losses (Tversky and Kahneman,
1981). Whereas early work assumed that risk preferences for
gains negatively predicted risk preferences for losses, con-
temporary studies have shown that risk preferences are inde-
pendent between frames (Kurnianingsih and Mullette-Gillman,
2015; Tymula et al., 2013). This, in turn, may suggest that risk-
taking for gains and losses have different cognitive under-
pinnings, and thus are impacted differently by the same inter-
vention. Some evidence in support of this possibility comes from
Kurnianingsih and Mullette-Gillman, who found dissociations in
how the value was encoded neurologically for gains and losses
(Kurnianingsih and Mullette-Gillman, 2016). Though others have
failed to detect a strict anatomical division between the encoding
of gains and losses, these appear to activate different brain
regions, with losses being more associated with amygdala acti-
vation, whereas gains are associated with activity in the ven-
tromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) (Pessiglione and Delgado,
2015). This distinction is further supported as patients with
damaged amygdalas exhibit less loss aversion (De Martino et al.,
2010). Finally, recent evidence suggests that manipulations of
attentional load impact learning from prospective gains and losses
differently, consistent with the idea that the effect of interventions
may differ between these two domains (Boroujeni et al., 2021).
A recent study tested this concept by comparing the effec-
tiveness of two common types of behavioural interventions:
nudges and boosts (Franklin et al., 2019). Nudges involve small
changes in the choice environment aiming to encourage better
decisions without substantially altering the incentives of the
options, often by changing how information is presented
(Sunstein, 2014). Franklin et al. evaluated two nudge interven-
tions: a disclosure nudge, which informed participants of the EV
of each option, and a social nudge, that informed participants that
the advantageous option was the most popular option.
Boosts support individuals to make more informed or well-
considered choices by highlighting important features of the
decision (Grüne-Yanoff and Hertwig, 2016; Hertwig, 2017;
Hertwig and Grüne-Yanoff, 2021). These interventions have a
successful track record in real-world applications, involving risky
and uncertain choices both in the financial domain (Ruggeri et al.,
2018), and adjacent domains such as household energy con-
sumption (Heutel, 2019; Schleich et al., 2019). In experimental
contexts, this typically involves simple, salient tools that assist
participants in assigning clear valuations to choices. In the
Franklin et al. experiment, for example, the boost intervention
encouraged focused deliberation by teaching participants how to
compute simple EVs and encouraged them to use this knowledge
when making decisions. In more applied settings, boosts often
take the form of calculators or rating tools/maps that allow
decision-makers to input personal, critical information that is
automatically converted into quantitative choices. For example,
determining the ideal amount to pay on a credit card bill by
determining available finances, income, the amount owed, and
interest differences between savings and credit. These applications
of boosts could potentially address economic inequalities given
their focus on equity within interventions rather than applying
one-size-fits-all choice suggestions.
In the Franklin et al. experiment, both the disclosure nudge
and the boost increased the number of advantageous choices an
individual made. However, the social nudge was ineffective,
possibly because the participants did not view each other as a
meaningful reference group for financial decisions. Additionally,
Franklin et al. found that participants in the boost condition
made the most advantageous choices for gain-framed items,
whereas participants in the disclosure condition made the most
advantageous choices for loss-framed items. In other words, the
effectiveness of the interventions was moderated by the frame of
the items, which is compatible with the theory that the cognitive
structures that allow us to choose between risky options are
different for gains and losses. Finally, Franklin et al. found that
both nudges and boosts were most effective for those partici-
pants who picked suboptimal choices pre-intervention. They
interpreted this to mean that the interventions were most ben-
eficial for less competent decision-makers. This has important
policy implications, because it may explain some of the het-
erogeneity in behavioural interventions (Bryan et al., 2021;
Yarkoni, 2020) that may limit their effectiveness in public policy
(Sunstein, 2017).
Franklin et al. provide insight into the effectiveness of nudges
and boosts, yet the item set they used limited what conclusions
could be drawn. For all experimental items in the gain frame the
risky option was advantageous, whereas, for the experimental
items in the loss frame, the certain option was advantageous. This
conflation of item frame and risk advantage was intentional to
reduce ceiling effects. However, it made it impossible to deter-
mine whether the boost intervention resulted in a greater pro-
pensity to pick the advantageous option, or if it just promoted
risk-taking (which happened to be advantageous in this narrow
experimental context). Additionally, the moderation effect
between pre-intervention choices and the impact of the inter-
ventions can be interpreted in two equally valid ways. The
authors interpreted this moderation from a skill perspective:
participants who were unable to identify the highest EV option at
baseline learned how to do so from the intervention. However,
another explanation is equally consistent with the data: rather
than teaching participants a new skill, the interventions improved
the relative salience of EV relative to risk, so that the participants
whose baseline risk-preferences were incompatible with max-
imising EV inhibited their risk preferences for the experimental
task. Here we disambiguate these results by replicating Franklin
et al. (2019) with an extended item set that orthogonalises item
frame from risk advantage. Because the social nudge was inef-
fective in Franklin et al. (2019) we did not include that condition
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in this study, allowing us to obtain larger sample sizes for the
remaining conditions.
This setup allows us to evaluate whether the interventions
impact risk-taking differently depending on the frame of the
choice. It also allows us to test whether the interventions speci-
fically promote adaptive risk-taking or adaptive risk avoidance
and whether their impact is moderated by underlying risk pre-
ferences. These distinctions are of societal importance because
they would provide important information on how these inter-
ventions are best targeted, e.g., lack of savings has been associated
with excessive risk-avoidance for gains (Carvalho et al., 2016),
whereas people with gambling addiction are excessively risk-
seeking. In line with the recent literature, we expect that risk
preferences will only be weakly correlated between frames, absent
of intervention (Kurnianingsih and Mullette-Gillman, 2015;
Tymula et al., 2013). We also expect both the disclosure nudge
and boost intervention to increase the number of advantageous
choices. We expect the frame of the items to moderate inter-
vention effectiveness, but we are agnostic as to whether the
interventions are particularly effective in promoting advantageous
risk-seeking or advantageous risk avoidance. Finally, we expect
that pre-intervention choices will interact with intervention
effectiveness, but we are agnostic as to whether this effect will be
best explained by baseline performance moderating the effec-
tiveness of the interventions, or the interventions inhibiting risk
preferences.
Methods
Stimuli. The experimental items were binary forced choices
where one option involved a certain gain, and the other option
involved some probability of a greater gain and some probability
of no gain. Experimental items varied in terms of outcome
magnitude, the probability of the uncertain outcome, risk
advantage, and whether the choice was framed in terms of gains
or losses. Each of these stimulus dimensions had two levels,
leading to 24= 16 experimental items. For a full list of the items
see Table 1.
Procedure. Italian participants were recruited through the online
recruitment platform Prolific and were paid the equivalent of 1.50
GBP for their participation. Prior to the survey, they gave
informed consent. This study was granted IRB approval from the
Centre for Business Research at Judge Business School, University
of Cambridge. The survey began with three pre-intervention
items intended to capture baseline risk preferences: two in the
gain frame and one in the loss frame. One item in the gain frame
and one item in the loss frame mimicked the structure of the
experimental items. These were used to capture pre-intervention
risk preferences. For the third item, the EVs for the risky and
certain options were equal. This item was used to stratify parti-
cipants so that the same proportion of risk-seeking individuals
were assigned to each experimental condition (control, nudge,
and boost), but was not included in any analyses.
In the control condition, participants were presented with the
16 experimental items immediately. In the nudge condition,
participants read a brief explanation of EV and the EVs of the
options were presented with the experimental items. For the
boost intervention, EV was explained to participants and they
were taught how to calculate EVs. They then had to compute the
EV for three prospects and could not progress with the
experiment until they had done so correctly. The experimental
items were then presented in the same way as for the control
group. For all conditions, the item order was randomised, as was
the order of the response options. Once the experimental phase
was completed, participants encountered an attention check that
asked them about their favourite colour, but immediately
afterwards they were instructed to write “tomato” into the text
box. We modified the attention check relative to Franklin et al.
(2019) to make it a “fair” attention check according to Prolific’s
guidelines (https://researcher-help.prolific.co/hc/en-gb/articles/
360009223553-Using-attention-checks-as-a-measure-of-data-
quality). Finally, participants completed demographic questions
pertaining to their gender, their age, country of residence,
whether they were born in their country of residence or had
migrated, level of education, relationship status, employment
status, annual household income, and whether they used a
calculator when answering the experimental items. For the full
survey in English and Italian see Appendices A and B. For a
graphic representation of the procedure see Fig. 1.
Participants. Four-hundred, twenty-seven participants com-
pleted the survey. Of these, one was excluded because their IP
address had been used before, so we could not rule out that they
had completed the survey previously. An additional 37 partici-
pants were dropped for failing the attention check (see the section
“Procedure”), leading to a final sample of 389. For a demographic
overview (see Table 2).
Statistical models. The data from this experiment were analysed
by hierarchical logistic regression models, with items nested
within participants, and the y-variable encoding whether the
advantageous (highest EV) option was chosen in a given trial.
This formulation allows for the inclusion of item-level, partici-
pant-level, and condition-level effects in a single framework. We
used this modelling approach to replicate the findings from
Franklin et al. (2019), by only including the eight items the
current study shares with that study (see Appendix C) and to
evaluate the relative importance of propensity for risky choice vs.
propensity for advantageous choice. The models are nested so
that each new model is an extension of the preceding one.
Our null model assumes that participants vary in their
propensity to pick the highest EV option, as a function of the
frame of the item and whether the high-value option of that item
was risky. In other words, we assume that our participants have
an average tendency to maximise EV and an average tendency to
be risk-seeking, but that these propensities are not captured by
the pre-intervention items and are not meaningfully impacted by
the interventions. We formalize these assumptions in the
following hierarchical regression model:
Pr Choicei ¼ EVmaxi
 
¼ logit1 αj i½  þ β1GainFramei þ β2RiskAdvantageousiþβ3GainFramei ´RiskAdvantageousi
 
for i ¼ 1; :::; I
logit1 xð Þ ¼ ex1þex
αj  N μα; σ2α
 
for j ¼ 1; :::; J
β1;2;3  N 0; 5ð Þ
μα  N 0; 5ð Þ
σ2α  Exp 1ð Þ
GainFrame is coded 1 if the associated item was framed as a
gain and 0 if it was framed as a loss. RiskAdvantageous is
coded as 1 if the risky option was advantageous for the item
and 0 if it was not. αj are participant-wise intercepts drawn
from a normal distribution with weakly informative
hyperparameters. I is the total number of trials (6832),
whereas J is the total number of participants (389).
Pre-intervention EV propensity: our second model represents
the hypothesis that pre-intervention choices capture a propensity
to make advantageous choices (and so predict post-intervention
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choices), and that this propensity may differ by frame. We
formalized this by expanding the null model so that:
Pr Choicei ¼ EVmaxi
 
¼ logit1







for i ¼ 1; :::; I
β1;:::; 7  N 0; 5ð Þ
PreIntGain was 1 if the participant picked the highest value
option for pre-intervention gain frame item and 0
otherwise. PreIntLoss was 1 if the participant picked the
highest value option for the pre-intervention loss frame
item and 0 otherwise.
Pre-intervention risk propensity: our third model represents the
hypothesis that pre-intervention items capture propensities for
risky choice as well as advantageous choice. The intuition behind
this model is that we included risk-advantage as a parameter so
that our model could capture a pattern where participants were
more likely to choose the high EV option when it was risky, but
less likely to choose the high EV option when it was certain (or
vice-versa). In other words, this more flexible model allowed for
the possibility that the pre-intervention items captured partici-
pants’ propensity to take risks, rather than their propensity to
maximise EV. We extended model two so that:












for i ¼ 1; :::; I
β1;:::; 11  N 0; 5ð Þ
Intervention EV propensity: our fourth model adds dummy-
coded fixed effects for the boost and nudges interventions,
respectively, as well as interaction terms between the frame of the
item and the intervention. It represents the hypothesis that the
interventions increase advantageous choices independent of
whether it is the risky or certain option that is advantageous.
Pr Choicei ¼ EVmaxi
 
¼ logit1 :::þ β12Boosti þ β13Nudgei þ β14GainFramei
´Boosti þ β15GainFramei ´Nudgei
 
for i ¼ 1; :::; I
β1;:::; 15  N 0; 5ð Þ
where Boost is coded as 1 if the experimental trial came from a
participant in the boost condition and 0 otherwise, and Nudge is
coded as 1 if the participant was in nudge condition and 0
otherwise.
Intervention risk propensity: our fifth model adds interaction
terms between risk-advantage, intervention, and frame. Repre-
sents the hypothesis that interventions impact the propensity to
select the highest EV option differently when that option is risky
relative to when it is certain.
Pr Choicei ¼ EVmaxi
 
¼ logit1
:::þ β16Boosti ´RiskAdvantageousi þ β17Nudgei
´RiskAdvantageousi þ β18GainFramei ´RiskAdvantageousi





β1;:::; 19  N 0; 5ð Þ
Moderation: our sixth model adds fixed-effect interactions
between the interventions, the experimental item frame, and pre-
intervention choices. This model represents the hypothesis that
the intervention effectiveness is moderated by pre-intervention
Fig. 1 The experimental procedure. Participants first completed three pre-
intervention gambles, then were randomly assigned to one of three
experimental conditions (stratified by baseline risk preference). Finally, all
participants completed the same demographic section.
Table 2 Demographic overview.
Gender
Male Female Other





Secondary School High School Undergraduate Degree Postgraduate Degree
13 (3.3%) 196 (50.4%) 101 (26.0%) 79 (20.3%)
Relationship status
Single In a relationship Engaged Married
158 (40.6%) 106 (27.2%) 58 (14.9%) 67 (17.2%)
Annual household income in 1000€
12 or less 12–22 22–31 31 or more
103 (28.1%) 82 (22.3%) 90 (24.5%) 92 (25.1%)
Table 3 Bayesian model comparisons.
Model WAIC SE ΔWAIC ΔSE
5. Moderation 6859.7 76.6 −3.7 8.7
4. Intervention risk propensity 6856.0 75.8 19.3 11.12
3. Intervention EV propensity 6875.3 75.6 29.5 12.0
2. Pre-intervention risk propensity 6904.8 74.6 360.2 43.8
1. Pre-intervention EV propensity 7265.0 68.1 42.8 15.8
0. Null 7307.8 66.2
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choice.
Pr Choicei ¼ EVmaxi
 
¼ logit1
:::þ β20Boosti ´PreIntGaini ´
RiskAdvanatageousi þ β21Boosti ´PreIntLossi
´RiskAdvanatageousi þ β22Nudgei ´PreIntGaini ´
RiskAdvanatageousi þ β23Nudgei ´PreIntLossi ´
RiskAdvanatageousi þ β24Boosti ´PreIntGaini ´
GainFramei ´RiskAdvantageousiþ
β25Boosti ´PreIntLossi ´GainFramei ´
RiskAdvantageousi þ β26Nudgei ´PreIntGaini
´GainFramei ´RiskAdvantageousi þ β27Nudgei





for i ¼ 1; :::; I
β1;:::; 27  N 0; 5ð Þ
We ran these models in rStan (Stan Development Team, 2018)
on four chains with 12,000 samples per chain, the first 2000 in
each discarded as warmup. All chains converged with Rhat values
of 1. We evaluated model performance based on the Widely
Applicable Information Criterion (WAIC; Vehtari et al., 2017), as
implemented in the rethinking R package (McElreath, 2016). As
with other information criteria, lower WAIC scores indicate
better performance. It is important to note that one should not
compare “raw” WAIC scores and standard deviations in this case,
because since these models share predictors, they also share
information and estimation uncertainty, and we want to ignore
this shared estimation uncertainty when comparing models
(McElreath, 2016). This can be achieved by doing paired
comparisons captured by the ΔWAIC, where positive numbers
signify that more information is captured by the more complex
model and negative numbers suggest that the simpler model best
captures the data. In cases where the difference in WAIC is within
the ΔSE, we can assume model equivalence, in which case we will
favour the simpler model to maintain parsimony.
One benefit of Bayesian regression analysis is that one does not
just come away with point estimates for regression coefficients,
but rather full posterior distributions. This has the advantage that
one naturally gets a range of effect sizes for each predictor within
the model and that these ranges can be compared directly to
determine the relative weights of the included predictors. An
additional advantage of the Bayesian framework is that
coefficients can be added together to produce posteriors for
specific conditions. For example, if we want to know the null
model log-likelihood of selecting the advantageous option for
items in the gain frame where the risky option is advantageous,
we can additively combine the posteriors of the intercept, the gain
frame parameter, the risk advantage parameter, and the gain
frame risk advantage interaction. This has the attractive property
that it is easy to contrast theoretically important conditions that
are encoded over multiple parameters.
We combined the posterior distributions of the coefficients of
the best-fitting models in this way to reach a richer understanding
of our results. For all comparisons between posterior distributions
we report p, which is simply the proportion of posterior samples
from the first distribution that are larger than the samples from
the second distribution. This provides the strength of evidence of
a directionality effect and can be read as “the probability that
quantity 1 is greater than quantity 2, conditional on the model
assumptions and the data”. To complement these directional
probabilities, we also report total variation distance (TVD), which
captures how similar or different two probability distributions are
by evaluating their predictions. If the two distributions make the
same predictions the TVD= 0, and if they make completely non-
overlapping predictions TVD= 1 (Gibbs and Su, 2002).
Results
Correlation between gains and losses. In line with previous
work, we found that pre-intervention risk preferences are not
significantly correlated across frames (r= 0.08, 95% CI= [−0.02‒
0.18], p= 0.12), and confidence intervals are bounded below 0.2
in either direction, so global effects are likely small. To further
explore how consistent risk preferences are within and between
frames, we grouped the experimental items based on frame (gain
or loss) and risk advantage (whether the risky or certain option
had the highest EV), and correlated risk preferences across these
four categories for the control group. Risk preferences were fairly
consistent across frames, but not across risk advantages. Specifi-
cally, items that shared the same frame but differed with regards
to risk advantage correlated about twice as highly as items that
shared the same risk advantage but differed with regards to frame
(see Fig. 2).
Propensities for risk or EV: Model comparisons. As stated in
the introduction, the main benefit of the current study is that it
allows for the distinction between the propensity to pick risky
options from the propensity to pick the advantageous option,
because, in contrast to previous studies, the frame of each item is
unrelated to whether the risky option is advantageous.
If pre-intervention choices capture propensity for advanta-
geous choice rather than propensity for risk, they should predict
advantageous choices regardless of whether the risky or certain
option is advantageous. In contrast, if pre-intervention choices
primarily capture risk propensities, they should be associated with
more advantageous choices only when the risk advantage pre-
and post-intervention match, and conversely, they should be
associated with fewer advantageous choices when they are
mismatched. These two hypotheses, pre-intervention choices
capturing risk propensity vs pre-intervention choices capturing
the propensity to maximise EV can be evaluated mathematically
by including an interaction term between pre-intervention choice
Fig. 2 Correlation between risky choices based on frame and risk
advantage for the control group. Note. Items that share a frame but differ
in risk advantage correlate more strongly than items that share the same
advantageous option but differ on frame.
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and risk advantage. Such an interaction term should only
improve model performance if the pre-intervention choice is a
reliable indicator of risk propensity. The same logic can be
applied to the interventions: if interventions impact risk
propensities, interaction terms between the interventions and
risk advantage should improve model performance, whereas if the
interventions only impact the propensity to pick the advanta-
geous option, they should not.
Note. Models are ordered in terms of complexity. Delta terms
capture the difference between the current model and the model
one row below, see Table 3.
First, accounting for the impact of pre-intervention choices
moderately improves model performance relative to the null
model; accounting for whether the advantageous option was risky
for the experimental items leads to a massive further improve-
ment (nearly 8 times the standard error of the WAIC difference).
This suggests that pre-intervention choices primarily capture risk
preferences, as illustrated in Fig. 3. Accounting for experimental
conditions led to further improvements in model performance, as
did the extended model allowed the effect of the experimental
conditions to vary based on risk advantage. This suggests that the
interventions encourage certain advantageous choices and risky
advantageous choices to a different extent. Finally, allowing pre-
intervention choices to moderate the effectiveness of the
experimental conditions lead to slightly worse model fit,
indicating that the effectiveness of the interventions do not differ
depending on pre-intervention choices. To summarise, these
model comparisons suggest that pre-intervention choices pri-
marily capture the propensity to take risks, rather than the
propensity to choose high-EV options, and that the effectiveness
of the interventions vary depending on whether the certain or
risky option has the highest EV. To explore these effects more in
detail we will analyse the posterior coefficients of the best fitting
model (Model 4).
Propensities for risk or EV: Coefficient analyses. Figure 3
indicates that pre-intervention choices predict risk propensities,
as it shows that participants who make risky choices prior to the
intervention are more likely to pick the advantageous option
post-intervention when it is risky, but are less likely to do so when
it is certain. This pattern holds regardless of whether the pre-
intervention frame matches the frame of the post-intervention
item. Analytically, this is supported for the loss frame pre-
intervention item both for experimental items in the loss frame
(p= 1, TVD= 0.99) and in the gain frame (p= 1, TVD= 0.99).
It is also true for the gain-frame pre-intervention item, regardless
of whether the experimental item is in the loss frame (p= 1,
TVD= 0.99) or gain frame (p= 0.92, TVD= 0.65). Surprisingly,
the pre-intervention items seem to be more diagnostic of
experimental risk preferences in the opposite frame both in the
gain frame pre-intervention item (p= 1, TVD= 0.99), and in the
loss frame pre-intervention item (p= 0.99, TVD= 0.99).
Finally, we explored the impact of the interventions on
propensities for risk and EV (see Fig. 4). Participants made more
advantageous choices when a certain option was advantageous
(p= 1, TVD= 1), signifying general risk-aversion. This gap
between certain and risky advantageous choices was greater in the
gain frame than in the loss frame (p= 1, TVD= 1), signifying
that the risk-aversion was stronger for gains than losses. In the
gain frame, the boost condition was associated with more
advantageous choices than the nudge condition (p= 1,
TVD= 0.99) and the control condition (p= 1, TVD= 1). The
same pattern held true for losses, with the boost intervention
outperforming both the control condition (p= 1, TVD= 1) and
the nudge intervention (p= 1, TVD= 0.99). There is strong
evidence that the nudge condition outperformed the control
condition in the gain frame (p= 0.99, TVD= 0.92), and weaker
evidence that it did so in the loss frame (p= 0.89, TVD= 0.59).
To summarise, the boost condition was associated with the most
Fig. 3 Posterior log odds of advantageous choice as a function of risk. Posterior log odds of advantageous choice as a function of whether the pre-
intervention choice was risky and whether the frame of the experimental item matched that of the pre-intervention item. Choosing the risky option pre-
intervention is indicative of riskier choices post-intervention, regardless of whether the post-intervention frame is matching or not. In fact, pre-intervention
choices are more predictive of risk preferences for experimental items with incongruent frames, as is illustrated by the fact that the distributions on the
main diagonal are further apart than those on the counter diagonal.
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advantageous choices for both frames, followed by the nudge
condition, with the control condition being associated with the
fewest advantageous choices. There is weak evidence that the
effectiveness of the interventions in promoting advantageous
choice varies by frame. Specifically, there is weak evidence that
the boost intervention worked better in the gain frame than in the
loss frame (p= 0.89, TVD= 0.54), and the same is true for the
nudge intervention (p= 0.86, TVD= 0.47).
To investigate how the interventions impacted risk propen-
sities, we compared the three experimental conditions based on
item frame and risk advantage. For experimental items presented
in the gain frame where the certain option was advantageous, we
found that boosts were associated with a moderate increase in
advantageous choices compared to the control condition
(p= 0.99, TVD= 0.89) and the nudge condition (p= 0.85,
TVD= 0.51). Similarly, the nudge condition was associated with
somewhat more advantageous choices than the control condition
(p= 0.93, TVD= 0.68). When the risky option was advanta-
geous, the boost intervention strongly dominated the nudge
intervention (p= 1, TVD= 1) and the control condition (p= 1,
TVD= 1), and the nudge intervention was associated with
reliably stronger performance than the control group (p= 0.99,
TVD= 0.90). In the loss frame, we found that the boost condition
and the nudge condition were associated with similar perfor-
mances for items where a certain option was advantageous
(p= 0.51, TVD= 0.07). Both interventions outperformed the
control condition (pboost= 0.99, TVDboost= 0.89; pnudge= 0.99,
TVDnudge= 0.90). When the risky option was advantageous, the
boost intervention outperformed both the nudge intervention
(p= 1, TVD= 1) and the control condition (p= 1, TVD= 1),
but the latter two groups had similar performances (p= 0.30,
TVD= 0.27). These analyses suggest that the boost intervention
led to more advantageous choices by encouraging risk-taking
when it was advantageous to do so.
Discussion
This study explores how boosts and nudges influence risky
decision-making; specifically, whether intervention effectiveness
depends on how choices are framed, and whether risky or certain
options are advantageous. We find that the boost intervention is
associated with more advantageous choices than the nudge
intervention, irrespective of choice frame. Furthermore, it seems
that boosts work primarily by promoting risk-taking when risk-
taking is advantageous. This suggests a different interpretation of
previously published findings, which found that the effectiveness
of boosts depended on the chosen frame, but which conflated
choice frame with whether risk-taking was advantageous
(Franklin et al., 2019). These results have important real-world
consequences because if boosts improve financial decision-
making by promoting adaptive risk-taking, that implies that the
effectiveness of boosts interventions depend on (1) the extent to
which the environment rewards risk-taking and (2) the extent to
which these opportunities are exploited. To put it plainly, boosts
might lead to great improvements in environments that reward
risk-taking and for populations who are excessively risk averse.
This has societal implications because a field experiment found
that people without savings are particularly risk averse for gains
(Carvalho et al., 2016), which may serve as an additional barrier
to wealth accumulation.
The other key insight from this work is that pre-intervention
items seem to capture propensities for risk-seeking rather than
propensities for high or low EVs. This finding complements the
previous finding because it suggests that policymakers can iden-
tify people who would most benefit from boost interventions by
studying their choice histories. Greater societal inequality has
been associated with greater risk-taking (Payne et al., 2017), so
interventions like ours might be particularly beneficial in those
contexts. In contrast with previous work, we did not find that the
informativeness of pre-intervention choices were higher for
future choices with a matching frame. However, since we found
that frame congruence did predict risk propensity for the control
group, and pre-intervention choices were only captured by two
items, these analyses may be underpowered. Future work should
measure pre-intervention preferences more robustly to obtain a
stronger sense of how they relate to framing effects and the extent
to which they moderate the impact of interventions.
Finally, we found that both interventions were slightly more
effective at promoting advantageous choice in the gain frame in
the loss frame. This effect is tenuous and needs to be replicated in
a larger sample. However, if it holds it would have important
implications for real-world applications, as it implies that people
are more sensitive to external circumstances when thinking about
gains than when thinking about losses. Such findings have direct
policy implications. The most evident is that behavioural inter-
ventions might be more effective when targeting savings, pensions
and investments—which are unequivocally gain focused—than
when targeting credit programs such as student loans and
mortgages which has a loss component due to interest rates and
the endowment effect associated with having to pay back what
was given. These applications will be specifically relevant in
addressing heterogeneity in choices created by economic
inequalities (Adamkovič and Martončik, 2017).
The current research suffers from two primary limitations.
First, the outcomes of the choices are hypothetical. However,
earlier research suggests that participants tend to behave similarly
for hypothetical and consequential decisions with regards to
gambles and framing effects (Kühberger et al., 2002; Hoffmann
et al., 2015; for a theoretical treatment see Read, 2005), and this
pattern holds for this experimental setup (Franklin et al., 2019).
Second, our results only cover a very specific type of risky choices,
with binary options and a very simple pay-out structure. Real-
world choices generally involve a much greater range of alter-
natives, that differ on a wider range of dimensions, and where
both probabilities and pay-offs are less well-specified. This is
particularly true once one considers nudge and boost applications
outside of the domain of personal finances, e.g., healthcare (Patel
Fig. 4 Probability of advantageous choice as a function of item frame,
risk advantage, and experimental condition. A Shows empirical means,
error bars are bootstrapped 95% CI. B Shows posterior probabilities from
the best-fitting model (Model 4). The boost intervention is associated with
more advantageous choices when the risky option is advantageous, for both
gain frame and loss frame items. Intervention effects when the certain
option is advantageous are much smaller.
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et al., 2018) or energy justice (DellaValle and Sareen, 2020).
Therefore, the current experimental task structure may overstate
the benefit of the boost intervention, as the EV calculation is
simple compared to most real-world settings. Additionally, it is
worth noting that we have focused explicitly on monetary out-
comes. This is intentional, because it is an outcome with attractive
mathematical properties that most people have an intuitive
understanding of, but it does raise questions about the gen-
eralisability of our results, as there is some evidence that risk
attitudes vary depending on the type of outcome (Blais and
Weber, 2006; see also Highhouse et al., 2017).
To address these limitations, future work should examine
whether the general patterns outlined here apply to real-world
choices. Specifically investigating how boosts can improve risk-
management in relation to insurance, savings, and debt
repayment.
Conclusion
Decision-making under risk is a ubiquitous problem, which is
challenging to most people because they find probabilities
counterintuitive. Teaching people about EVs is an easy way to
help them reason more effectively about risky decisions when
probabilities and outcomes are known. In this study, we com-
pared two light touch interventions that do just that: a nudge that
presents the EVs of each option and a boost that teaches parti-
cipants how to calculate EVs themselves. We found that the boost
was associated with picking the highest EV option more often
than the nudge or a no-intervention control group, both for
choices framed as gains and choices framed as losses, and that it
operated by promoting adaptive risk-taking. It is an open ques-
tion whether this pattern holds for real-world decisions that
involve more complex prospects with multiple possible outcomes
and less certain probabilities. Should these results prove to gen-
eralise, they have important implications for how to improve
financial decision-making, especially for people with little training
or experience in making such choices.
Data availability
The datasets, analysis code, and Bayesian models referenced in
this study are available on the OSF: https://osf.io/9np3c/.
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